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I
n the previous article (EPW, April 14,
2001) I had focused upon trends in
capital flows into India and their impact
upon the real exchange. In the second and
concluding part of the paper, I focus upon
their impact upon money supply. Capital
inflows can be traced to either inter-
national reserves’ accumulation or a cur-
rent account deficit, depending upon the
exchange rate regime. If there is no inter-
vention by the central bank, i e, the ex-
change rate regime is a pure float, then the
net increase in capital assets via capital
inflows would be associated with a similar
increase in imports and therefore a widen-
ing current account deficit. Alternatively,
if the exchange rate regime is fixed and
the central bank intervenes to counter
appreciation pressures, then capital inflows
would be visible in increases in foreign
exchange reserves.
Figures 1 and 2 plot foreign exchange
reserves and the current account deficit
(per cent GDP) for India over 1970-99.
The current account deficit is seen to be
narrowing after touching 3.2 per cent in
1991, the year of crisis. The steep increase
in foreign exchange reserves (Figure 1) is
concurrent with this decline, suggesting
absorption of foreign currency inflows by
the central bank.1 In 1993, the first year
of the capital surge, almost the entire net
capital inflows were absorbed as foreign
exchange reserves. In 1994, almost one-
third of net capital inflows were utilised
so; from 1996 onwards, the Reserve Bank
has typically absorbed 50 per cent of net
capital inflows into international reserves.
The stock of international reserves in 1999-
2000 (US $ 38 bn), represents an increase
of nearly 552 per cent over the 1991 level.
Between 1991 and 1998, the rate of growth
of foreign exchange reserves in India
averaged 58 per cent against a negative
average of 16.8 per cent for 1985-90.2 The
heavy build-up of reserves in the aftermath
of capital inflows into India mirrors the
reserve accumulation patterns of countries
in the Asian and Latin American regions,
all of who augmented their foreign ex-
change reserves during the period of heavy
capital inflows. In fact, Figure 1 mimics
the trend in international reserves observed
for a group of Asian and Latin American
countries in Figures 3 and 4.
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Capital inflows impact upon domestic
money supply through accumulation of net
foreign currency assets with the central
bank. Whether the monetary base is altered
or not depends upon whether the central
bank intervenes to maintain a fixed ex-
change rate or allows it to float freely with
no intervention. If there is intervention,
then an accumulation of international
reserves represents an increase in the net
foreign exchange assets of the central bank
and directly affects the monetary base.
What has been the impact of capital in-
flows upon domestic money supply in India
and how has monetary policy responded
to these inflows?
Though India has had a market-deter-
mined exchange rate since 1993, the
flexibility permitted by the monetary
authority has been limited. The size and
scale of intervention by the central bank
have increased significantly since 1993
[Kohli 2000] and the foreign exchange
reserves’ build-up has been substantial.
Tables 1 and 2, which present a profile of
monetary and fiscal indicators from 1985,
offer a perspective via the transmission
channel of net capital inflows, changes in
net foreign currency assets, the monetary
base and the broader monetary aggregates.
Some stylised facts can be established
about changes in the movements of mon-
etary aggregates after liberalisation. First,
increases in net foreign exchange assets of
the central bank account for most of the
increase in the monetary base (reserve
money) in the 1990s. As a percentage share
of M3, the monetary aggregate targeted by
the central bank, net foreign exchange assets
have grown from an average of 3.7 per cent
in the 1980s to 12.1 per cent in 1990s.3
Second, while fiscal policy-induced in-
creases in money supply have declined
somewhat in the post-liberalisation pe-
riod, it still remains an important exog-
enous source of monetary expansion. Third,
private sector credit appears to be the only
policy variable that is manipulated by the
central bank via interest rate and reserve
requirement changes to adhere to mon-
etary targets.
During the capital surge episode in
1993-95, for example, the central bank’s
monetary target (M3 growth rate of 15-16
per cent) was overshot and the monetary
base expanded both in nominal and real
terms (Cols 2 and 4, Table 1). As a result
of rapid growth of both nominal and real
money supply, and the pass-through be-
tween the exchange rate and domestic
prices, the rate of inflation rose to 10.8 per
cent. Prima facie, monetary policy appears
to have responded to counter the impact
of capital inflows, though monetary
variable are partly influenced by money
demand. For instance, interest rate move-
ments (Cols 5 and 6, Table 1), which
reflect both monetary as well as fiscal
changes, provide evidence of monetary
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The short experience with liberalisation of capital inflows documented in this paper highlights
the pressures of a capital surge upon domestic monetary management. It also reveals the
additional constraint of fiscal-led monetary expansion in India, which raises aggregate demand
and aggravates the inflationary impact of capital inflows. These pressures complicate
macroeconomic management as the only variable that can be varied in this scenario to control
inflation, or adhere to a monetary target, is domestic private sector credit.
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tightening. Nominal interest rates rose with
inflation, while the real interest rate rose
in 1993-94 and fell in 1994-95. Nominal
interest rates appear to have been raised
to prevent the real rate of interest rate
from declining.
Another perspective on monetary policy
response is offered by noting movements
in the monetary base in Table 2. Offsetting
squeezes on private domestic credit closely
correspond to accretions in net foreign
currency assets. Private sector absorption
thus adjusted during the capital inflow
period of 1993 and 1994. In fact, commer-
cial bank lending to the private sector was
almost constant at 23.8-23.3 per cent of
GDP between 1993 and 1997. Between
1993 and 1995, reserve requirements
(Col 8, Table 1) were steadily raised, pos-
sibly to limit the impact of money supply
via the banking system. Table 1 (Cols 1-4)
shows a sharp contraction in nominal and
real base money growth during 1995-96
and 1996-97, which brought about the fall
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Table  1:  Money  Growth  and  Interest  Rates Table  1:  Money  Growth  and  Interest  Rates Table  1:  Money  Growth  and  Interest  Rates Table  1:  Money  Growth  and  Interest  Rates Table  1:  Money  Growth  and  Interest  Rates
Nominal Real  M3 Nominal Real Nominal Real Cash Consoli-
Money Growth Monetary Monetary Interest Interest Reserve dated
Growth  (M3) Base Base Rates Ratesa   Ratio Govern-
Growth Growth     (Per  Cent (Per  Cent ment
Per   Per Deficit
Annum) Annum)
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
1985-88 17.1 8.6 18.2 10.0 –– 9,  9.5,  10, –
10.5,  11
1989-91b 17.9 5.6 13.2 4.5 - - 15.0 –
1992-93 14.8 4.3 11.3 1.2 17 6.2 15.0 7.19
1993-94 18.4 9.3 25.2 15.5 14 7.8 14.5,  14, 8.61
1994-95 22.3 10.4 22.1 10.1 15 5.1 14.5,  14.75, 7.27
15
1995-96 13.5 5.5 14.9 6.7 16.5 6.9 14.5,  14 6.92
1996-97 16.1 9.2 2.8 -3.3 14.8 6.0 13.5,  13, 6.83
12,  11.5,
11,  10.5,  10
1997-98 18.0 12.6 13.2 8.0 14 6.9 9.75,  9.5, 6.42
10,  10.5,
10.25
1998-99 18.3 10.7 14.6 7.2 12.5 3.6 10,  11,  10.5 8.32
1999-00 14.9 11.7 8.1 5.0 11.8 7.2 10,  9.5,  9,  8.5 7.63
Source: Cols  2-4,  Handbook  of  Statistics  on  the  Indian  Economy,  RBI,  1999;  Col  5,  Indian  Public  Finance
Statistics,  MoF,  DEA,  Economics  Division,  GoI.
a  =  nominal  interest  rates  minus  CPI  inflation  rates;  b  =  averages.Economic and Political Weekly April 21, 2001 1347
in the rate of broad money growth. Finally,
government credit, which had declined
between 1991-93, and has traditionally
been a major source of monetary expansion,
also contributed to the monetary base as
the fiscal deficit rose sharply in 1993-94.
Inferences based upon mere movements
of the monetary variables however, are in
danger of amounting to conjecture, as these
are also driven by domestic conditions. For
instance, note that the CRR falls in the
second episode of capital surge in 1996;
so do nominal interest rates, suggesting
domestic policy objectives guided mone-
tary policy response. The relationship
between capital inflows and money sup-
ply, therefore, needs to be investigated
more carefully. Recent econometric evi-
dence from other countries has revealed
the impact of capital flows upon monetary
growth. For instance, Kamin and Wood
(1998) uncover a significant independent
effect of capital flows upon domestic
money demand for Mexico and the Pacific
Basin group of countries. Both reserve
changes and net capital inflows tended to
lower interest rates and raise M2, particu-
larly in Mexico.
The interaction between capital flows
and domestic money supply however, needs
to be formally investigated in depth as a
monetary expansion implies inflation and
if the central bank’s monetary growth
targets are disrupted, it may be desirable
to insulate the impact of capital flows upon
money supply. This is typically done
through sterilisation, which is simply the
exchange of domestic assets for foreign
assets. Typical sterilisation tools in deve-
loping countries are open reserve require-
ments and to a lesser extent, open market
operations.4 The former have been a com-
mon monetary management tool in south-
east Asia, as also in some parts of Latin
America (Chile, Mexico), to insulate
domestic money supply from the expan-
sionary effects of capital inflows.5
In India, the monetary impact of re-
serves’ accumulation is neutralised
primarily through reserve requirement
changes on commercial banks’ liabilities.
India still relies on direct monetary control
instead of indirect monetary management
due to structural problems like interest rate
rigidities, and less developed short-term
money market, which limits optimal
utilisation of open market operations. Open
market operations are increasingly being
used since 1991, though they are limited
by the ability of bond and equity markets
to absorb government securities. As per-
centage to M3, open market operations
were only 0.28 per cent in 1994, increasing
to 2.2 per cent by 1999. Open market
operations appear to be used more to neutra-
lise foreign exchange market interventions
than as a monetary policy instrument.
While it is difficult to collect evidence
on the magnitude of sterilisation, it has
been conceded elsewhere that a complete
offset could not be achieved [Acharya
1999]. During the 1993-95 capital surge
episode in India, the cash reserve ratio was
raised in three stages from 14 to 15 per
cent in 1994-95 (Col 8, Table 1) to offset
the effects of capital inflows upon money
supply growth. Evidence gleaned from
existing statistics sheds some light on the
sterilisation activities of the central bank.
For example, holdings of private securities
by the commercial banks actually declined
during this period, whereas investment by
banks in government securities rose. The
latter continues to show a rising trend after
1992. As percentage to GDP, investment
in government securities have risen from
10.1 per cent in 1991 to 11.3 per cent in
1994, dropping to 10.8 per cent in 1995
and then again rising to 11.2 per cent
(1996) and 12.6 per cent in 1998. Finally,
a simple domestic credit reaction fitted on
to monthly data [see Kohli 2001] from
1993:03-2000:05 yields an offset coeffi-
cient of –1.09, indicating complete
sterilisation. Several variants of these
specifications suggest the offset coeffi-
cient to lie between 0.84-1.09, indicating
a high degree or complete sterilisation.
The offset (sterilisation) coefficient shows
that the RBI used domestic credit policy
to attain internal policy objectives while
engaging in sterilised intervention to in-
fluence/maintain the exchange rate. The
use of sterilisation policies has several
controversial implications, which are dis-
cussed in the concluding section of this
paper.
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The short experience with liberalisation of
capital inflows documented in this paper
highlights the pressures of a capital surge
upon domestic monetary management. It
also reveals the additional constraint of
fiscal-led monetary expansion in India,
which raises aggregate demand and aggra-
vates the inflationary impact of capital
inflows. These pressures complicate mac-
roeconomic management as the only vari-
able that can be varied in this scenario to
control inflation, or adhere to a monetary
target, is domestic private sector credit. A
popularly suggested macroeconomic policy
response during a capital surge to counter
their inflationary impact and lower aggre-
gate demand is to exercise fiscal restraint.
This option, however, has rarely been
exercised or observed [Edwards 2000], the
reason being that fiscal policy is usually
set according to medium- and long-term
projections and it is difficult to use it ef-
fectively for immediate effects. In India’s
case, however, there is still a strong argu-
ment for fiscal restraint as it incapacitates
monetary policy. If monetary management
is to be geared towards price stability with
an open capital account, it is important that
government credit should be curtailed.
Private sector credit variations can then be
released from the burden of adjustment to
keep pace with real GDP growth.
A final issue is the use of sterilisation
to limit the impact of foreign currency
inflows upon domestic money supply.
Many academics have noted the pitfalls
associated with sterilisation policies [see
Spiegel, Calvo 1991, amongst others] and
Table  2:  Movements  in  the  Monetary  Base  (Reserve  Money) Table  2:  Movements  in  the  Monetary  Base  (Reserve  Money) Table  2:  Movements  in  the  Monetary  Base  (Reserve  Money) Table  2:  Movements  in  the  Monetary  Base  (Reserve  Money) Table  2:  Movements  in  the  Monetary  Base  (Reserve  Money)
(Percentage  to  change  in  reserve  money)
∆RBICG ∆RBICC ∆NFA ∆GCL ∆NMLL ∆RM
1984/85-89/90* 105.5 13.6 7.6 2.0 28.7 100
1991-92 44.0 133.3 92.5 0.7 3.3 100
1993-94 3.0 -14.7 103.2 0.6 -7.9 100
1994-95 7.1 26.4 76.1 1.3 10.8 100
1995-96 79.3 34.9 -2.5 0.0 11.7 100
1996-97 49.6 -272.5 363.9 9.6 50.5 100
1997-98 41.9 7.8 80.3 0.7 30.7 100
1998-99 42.8 25.1 54.3 1.8 24.0 100
1999-00 -20.4 31.3 133.2 2.0 46.1 100
*Pre-90  figures  from  Joshi  and  Little  (1994:  253).  Author’s  calculations  for  the  rest  of  the  table.
RBICG:  RBI  credit  to  government
RBICC:  RBI  credit  to  commercial  sector,  including  commercial  banks
NFA:  RBI’s  net  foreign  exchange  assets
GCL:  Government  currency  liabilities  to  the  public
NMLL:  Net  non-monetary  liabilities  of  the  RBI
RM:  Reserve  money
RM=RBICG+RBICC+NFA+GCL-NMLLEconomic and Political Weekly April 21, 2001 1348
it is a controversial issue. One
reservation about sterilisation is its
effects upon interest rates. Since
sterilisation involves an exchange of
foreign currency assets for domestic
currency assets, the interest rate on the
latter has to be kept high to limit central
bank losses arising out of interest
differentials. This however, would serve
to attract further capital inflows, which
could be potentially destabilising in some
situations. Open market operations is
another channel through which
sterilisation may exert pressure on short-
term interest rates. On the other hand,
a non-sterilised intervention increases
the monetary base, resulting in lower
interest rates.
Two, sterilisation leads to an increase in
public debt, and these costs, termed as
quasi-fiscal costs in the literature, due to
a favourable interest differential for do-
mestic bonds, can be substantial. Calvo,
Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) have esti-
mated quasi-fiscal costs for Colombia at
0.5 per cent of GDP while Khan and
Reinhart estimate them between 0.25-0.5
per cent of GDP for Latin American
countries.6 No such estimates exist for
India at present and there is a need for
empirical studies on this issue. The sub-
stantial rise in commercial banks’ hold-
ings of government securities by the bank-
ing system in the 1990s, mentioned earlier
in the paper, suggests that the burden of
quasi-fiscal costs could be quite high.
Three, some researchers [for example,
Folkerts-Landau et al 1994] have noted
that sterilisation through reserve require-
ment changes will not be effective in
addressing capital inflows intermediated
outside the banking system, i e, bond and
equity markets. This is a relevant issue for
India for two reasons. First is the heavy
dependence upon reserve requirements as
a policy tool for monetary management.
To counter the impact of a capital surge
upon the stock market, effective open
market operations and a vibrant, active
market for both government and private
securities is a necessary prerequisite.
The second consideration in this regard is
that though a substantial amount of funds
in India are still intermediated through
the banking sector, its share in the total
financial assets of the economy is steadily
falling. Between 1990 and 1999, the bank-
ing sector’s share has fallen from 66.8
to 64.2 per cent, being substituted by the
rise of non-bank and investment institu-
tions.7 For instance, Spiegel (1995: 33) has
noted that the more developed the non-
financial sector, the less effective will be
sterilisation policy through standard open
market operations or through reserve re-
quirement changes. With the structure of
financial sector still evolving, and the
dilution of the banking sector, the future
effectiveness of reserve requirements is
questionable.
Other costs of sterilisation through re-
serve requirement changes are the low
rates of return on they bear, which distorts
the share of intermediation by the banking
sector. Another source of loss to the central
bank due to sterilisation is the interest
differential between the interest rate on
purchase of foreign exchange securities
and the interest rate paid on external debt
servicing [Spiegel 1995:18]. Clearly, a
major area that deserves to be explored in
depth is the costs associated with
sterilisation, which would no doubt be a
valuable input to the extent of use that
sterilisation policies can be put to.
Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes
[The views expressed are the author’s own and
not of the institution to which she belongs.]
1 The intervention activities of the RBI have been
extensively documented in Kohli (2000a, b).
2 One may also note at this point the conscious
efforts made by the authorities to boost foreign
exchange reserves through mobilisation of funds
from non-resident Indians, viz, the Resurgent
India Bonds (1998) and the Indian Millennium
Deposit Bonds (2000). These were targeted
exclusively at NRIs and overseas corporate
bodies predominantly owned by NRIs.
3 This is even more significant when compared to
a 12 per cent average share in the increase in the
monetary base in the 1980s (Report on Currency
and Finance, 1998-99, RBI, Mumbai).
4 In most developing countries, the securities
markets are thin, with the result that central
banks typically rely heavily on reserve
requirement changes.
5 Occasionally, other sterilisation instruments like
open market operations, swap operations with
commercial banks, cuts in central bank credit
and rediscounts, increases in the rediscount
rate, conversion of commercial bank debt of
public institutions and transfer of assets of
pension/provident funds, etc, have been used
to bring about monetary tightening. For a
detailed account of sterilisation methods and
experience in Asia, see Spiegel (1995).
6 Kletzer and Spiegel (2000) have extended
the analysis further to incorporate the role
quasi-fiscal costs might play in monetary policy
for a group of APEC countries. Though they
find these to be small in their influence upon
central bank behaviour, they do find they
might play a role in abandonment of a sterilis-
ation programme in the midst of a capital surge.
7 The fall in the banking sector’s assets in the
total financial system might have implications
for real exchange rate appreciation too. Evidence
from south-east Asia indicates that Korea, which
had the largest non-bank financial sector,
experienced the greatest degree of real exchange
rate appreciation, whereas countries with large
shares of assets in the banking sector, had no,
or moderate real exchange rate appreciation.
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‘Godmother’: Contesting Communal
Politics in Drought Land
Errata
In the article ‘“Godmother”: Contesting
Communal Politics in Drought Land’ by
Svati Joshi (EPW, December 2, 2000) the
following editing errors require correction:
(1) Page 4304, col 3, lines 24-25 from top,
delete “(see … 1982)”.
(2) Page 4305, col 2, lines 26-25 from bottom
should read “Veeram, and the entire Mer
community behind him, support …”
(3) Page 4306, col 2, lines 15-17, from top
should read “His misconception and
misuse of her power upsets Rambhi.”
(4) Page 4306, col 3, the first sentence of
the last para should read “‘Godmother’
begins and ends with a moving invocation
to the soil , a material, social and emotional
tearing away from which unleashes
changes of vast historical significance
for those who live by the land.”
(5) Page 4306, col 3, the first two sentences
of the endnote should read: “The Mers
of Saurashtra by Harshad Trivedi,
Baroda, 1982.  Information on the Mers
and the region is drawn from this book.”
The errors are deeply regretted.
–Ed.